"The problern which science hos to solve here consists in the explonotion of o sociol phenomenon, of o homogeneaus woy of octing on the port of the members of o community for which public motives ore recognlzoble, but for which in the concrete cose individual motives ore hord to disce r n." (Corl Menger 1985, 152) Abstract: The orticle discusses some of the fundomentot conceptuol ond theoreticol ospects of rational choice ond morol order. A distinction is drown between constitutionol interests ond complionce interests, ond it is orgued thot o vioble morol order requires thot the two interests somehow be brought into congruence. lt ls shown thot with regord to the prospects for o spontaneaus emergence of such congruence, o distinction between two kinds of morol rules which we coll trust-rules ond solidorlty-rules is of er uciol importonce.
I. Introduction
The cruciol dependence of the chorocter of o soclol ond economic order on the fromework of rules ond Institutions · within which individuols oct ond interoct hos been o centrot theme of clossicol politicol economy, ond it is o theme thot hos goined renewed ottention in modern economics ( Brennon/ Buchenon 1985) . One of the persistent issues in this context concerns the tenslon thot is perceived to exist between rational, self-interested behovior -os postuloted in economics -ond' the viobility of o morol order. While the generot benefits thot o morol order generotes ore quite obvious, it is for less obvious how rational pursuit of self-interest should induce the kind of conduct thot such an order requlres.
Our purpose in thls poper is to discuss some of the fundamental conceptuol ond theoreticol ospects of the 'rational choice ond morol order' issue, an issue thot, ot least since Thomos Hobbes, hos plogued sociol theorists. In foct, it is often referred to os the 'Hobbesion problern of sociol order' or simply the 'Hobbesion problem'. In sociology, an influentiol theoreticol program -ossocioted with the nomes of Emile Duckheim ond Tolcott Parsans -is even bosed on the cloim thot the economic, individuolistic-utilitorion trodltion hos not provided o sotisfoctory solution to the Hobbesion problern ond, for intrinsic reosons, is unoble to do so. Our purpose here is to argue t he opposite; to show that 1 and how 1 an answer to the Hobbesian question can be provided f r om an individuolistic 1 ra tional choice perspective.
The paper is organized as follows: Sections II and 111 analyze the 'rational choice and moral order' issue in terms of the cantrast between what we call const itutional interests, on the one side 1 and action interests or compliance lnterests 1 on t he other. We argue that the practical sol ution to the 'problem of social order' is thot of brlnglng people's action lnterests into congr uence wlth their constitutional lnterest s. Sections IV and V discuss the issue of how such congruence moy be spontaneously brought obout os o by-product of incentives that are 'naturally' generoted in the process of social interaction. Of particular lnterest in this context is the mechanism of reciprocity. Sections VI and VII are about o distinction between two kinds of rules thot we coll trust-rules ond solidarity -rules , the difference between which is of c r uciol relevance to the issue of spontaneaus emergence of o moral order. Sect ion VII I elaborates on some implications of our anolysis.
II . Mora l Rules, Constitu tional lnterests 1 and Action lnterests
Explonotory accounts of morol rules ore not always sufficiently careful to ovoid the 'funct lonalist follocy'. This follocy consists in assuming that by identifying the 'benefits' thot o moral code provides t o o group (corrmunity 1 social system 1 etc. ) 1 one has provided an a nswer to the question of why the respective code is honou red. The functionalist fallacy 1 is temp t ing because it seems quite natural to presume that the beneficiol consequences of rules ond Insti tu tions must hove something to do wit h t he foct that they exist ond persist. The problern with the functionolist fallacy ls not its focus on the beneflclal consequences or 1 in lts own terminology 1 on the functions that rules and Institutions serve withln a group . The problern rother is thot t he functionalist linkage provides no more t han the illusion of an explanation and distracts attention from the genuine chollenge which is thot of identifylng t he actual processes or mechonisms that estoblish the critical linkage between beneficial consequences and effective causes for behaviorally generoted rule s ond Institutions.
In discussions on t he rationale for ond the effective causes of moral rules 1 the familiar contrasts between 'individual ond group interests' 1 'private and common lnterest' 1 or 'individual and collective interest' are potentially misleading because these tend to suggest that a conflict of interests ls at issue 1 elther of interests experienced by differents entlties ('the individual' and 'the group') or interests that have to be . t roded off within t he behavioral calculus of a single per son (a 'narrow' self-interest and a Viktor Vanberg/ James M. Buchanan more 'noble' common interest). We propose an alternative Interpretation that differentiates between different Ievels of choice and between different kinds of in terests that are related to these Ievels of choice. In our framewerk, the issue is not one of conflicting preferences with regard to the same kind or Ievel of choice; the issue is, by cantrast, one of different kinds of choice, which, in turn, involve different interests. We separate, define, and cantrast two kinds of individual interests: ( 1) constitutional or rule interests, and (2) operational or action interests. An actor's constitutional interests are reflected in his preferences over potential alter native 'r ules of the game' for the social corrmu nity or g rou p within which he operates. His constitutional interests in form his choices insofar as these choices pertain to the kind of institutional order or order of rules under which he is to live. Or, stated somewhat differently, they reflect preferences that would 'emerge if he were to participate in choosing the constitution, in the broadest sense, for his respective social corrmunity. By comparison, a person's operational or action interests ore reflected in preferences over potential alternative courses of action under given situational constraints, including the constraints that pertain to the given structure of rules and Institutions.
Constitutional interests and operational interests, as deflned here, are experienced by the same person, and possibly simultaneously, yet there is no reason to expect that these interests will be either in 'natural harmony' or 'natural conflict'. As mentioned, trade-offs of the ordinary sort are not relevant here because these separate interests reflect an actor's preferences over different kinds of alternatives: Constitutional interests concern the imogined or real choice amang alternative institutional characteristics of one's social environment. They reflect, in other terms, a person's preferences over alternative institutional environments. Operational or action interests concern alternative courses of action within a given en vironment. They reflect a per son's behavioral p references u nder given environmental constraints. Whether these two interests are in congruence or harmony in the sense that a person prefers to comply with a rule that he prefer s constitutionally, is an empirical question the answer to which will depend on certain characteristics of the relevant social environment. More importantly, a person's constitutional interests do not automatically translote into corresponding action interests. My interest in living in a corrrnunity where promises are kept, for instance, does not ~ imply that I must have an interest in always keeping promises on my part. There is nothing 'inconsistent' in preferring a certain rule constitutionally and, at · the same time, given · the situaticinal constraints as they are, violating the rule in pursuit of one's oction interests. 3
Presupposing that there are certain rules on which people's constitutional interests converge, the centrat issue that a 'theory of social order' has to deal with concerns the social forces or mechanisms that tend to bring constitutional interests and action interests into correspondence. Such correspondence is needed in order for a generally preferred constitutional order to be operative. Accordingly, the analytical focus has to be on the reasons why and the conditrons under which individuals can be expected to comply with rules that are in their constitutional interest.
Ill. Constitutional Interests and Moral Philosophy
The disjvnction between people's constit utional interests and their operational or action interests, though not stated in these terms, has long been a puzzling issue to moral philosophers. Kant's reflections on the 'categorial imperative', for instance, )end themselves to be interpreted as reflections about constitutional interests, independent of whether this may pass as an 'authentic' interpretation or not. He examines arguments that might gvide people's constitutional interests in terms of preference for rules which could qualify as general Iews. He does not, however, examine the reasons that make people adopt as private maxims of behavior the general rules t hat they want to see practiced in the corrmunity. In our terms, Kant does not explain how people's action or compliance interests are supposed to come into congruence with their constitutional interests. 4
More recently, Dovid Gouthier ( 1986) has mode o major effort to estoblish a rational-choice link between constit utional and action interests. Gouthier anal yzes moral choice in terms of "a choice among dispositions" (1986, 183) rather than as a matter of possible morality -based responses to choice alternatives in specific situations. 5 Gauthier's central argument is that the choice of a general disposition to be moral can be rational even if this implies occasionally missed opportunities to earn )arger pay -offs by nonrnoral behavior. According to Gouthier, a moral disposition can be rational becavse it allows a person to secure access to cooperat ive arrangements, to potential gains from cooperation, from which persans without such a disposition would be excluded. 6
Though we shall develop a similar argument in a later section, there is a noteworthy difference between Gauthier's and our own· account of the poten tial correspondence between constitutional and action interests. Gauthier's aim is to show that such a correspondence is implied by a proper conception of rationality. He seems to deny the p~ssibility of a sy stematic gap "between rational compliance and rational agreement" ( 1987, 9) when he claims that "agreement on a set of principles qnrie. s with it, in some manner, adherence to those principles" (ibid., 13).7 In ou r view, Gauthier's ottempt to establish a direct link between the rationality of constitutional agreement and the rationality of compliance is not successful, and it cannot be succesful. Whether or not it is rational for persans to comply with rules that they constitutionolly moy ogree on is a matter of contingent, factual circumstances and not of ratlonality per se. lt depends on whether or not t he constroints thot persans foce after the ogreement -i.e. post-constitutionolly -moke it rational for them to comply with previously ogr eed on rules. There is, to be sure, o rational link between constitutionol ogreement ond complionce, but it is of an indirect rother thon o direct nature os suggested by Gouthier. If it is rational for persans to ogree on rules, it is rational for them to see to lt thot compllonce is rational ond, where necessory, to ogree on some opproprlate enforcement scheme, provided the costs of enforcement ore worronted by the prospective cooperotive goins. 8 lt hos olreody been stoted thot our interest here is precisely in identlfylng the conditions under which complionce on agreeoble rule~ con be rational, and in analyzing the sociol mechanisms ond processes that tend to bring obout those conditions. T here are two bosic woys in which o correspondence between constitutional lnterests ond operotionol or oction interests con be brought obout, two woys which ore complementory rother thon mutuolly exclusive. The one hos been stressed by Thomos Hobbes who, in his theory of sociol order, essentlolly orgued thot peaple who ogree in their constitutionol interest s con rotionolly choose to modlfy the structure under which they oct so os to bring obout Or') explicit correspondence of constitutionol ond complionce interests (b y deliberotely changing t he poyoff structure of the generalized prisoners' dilenmo motrix ) . In the Hobbesion conception the correspondence between the two kinds of interests is viewed os o product of individuals' rational copoclty to Implement t heir constitutionol interests, to diognose the problems they foce ond to chonge the choice-environment so os to moke mutuolly preferred behovior lndlviduolly rational.
The other solutlon to the 'correspondence problem' is most often ossoclated with Dovid Hume, Adam Ferguson and Adam Smith as weil as other Scottish moral philosophers of the eighteenth cen tury. These philosopher s suggested thot in some con texts of social Interaction spontaneaus forces moy be present thot will bring about a correspondence between constitutionol and compliance in te rests, os if by on 'invisible hond'. 9 This conceptlon focusses on the 'non-intentional' linkage between the two kinds of interests. lt a r gues that the constroints that moke it rational to comply wlth constitutionolly preferred rules ore, at least to some extent, on unintentionol -but systemotic -by-product of actions that persans take in pursuit of their immediate interests, wlthout any explicit regard to their constitutional preferences. lt is this Interpretation that hos been at the heart of the 'spontaneous order trodltion', o prominent contemporary advocate of which ls F .A. Hayek.
As indicated before, the two views on how a correspondence between constitutional and action interests may be generated are by no mean s mutually excl uslve. The two principles , t he Invisible-hand and the constitutional-constructivist variant, may supplement each other and operate in combination. In the following sections we shall seek to explore the potential range over which 'spontaneous forces' may be expected to generate a tolerable correspondence between the two kinds of interests ond to determine the critlcol Iimits beyond whlch deliberate concerted effort seems to be essential. In other words, we sholl exomine the possible forces that spontaneously, as a by -product of ordinary social interaction, tend to generate compllance wlth constitutionolly preferred maral rules. 10
IV. Coordinotion Rules ond Prisoner's Dilemma Rules
The spontaneaus order tradition cantoin s a certain ambiguity in its anolyticol approoch to the rules and Institutions issue, an cmbiguity that results from the foilure sufficiently to distinguish between two different kinds of Interaction problems, nomely, in the terminology of modern gome theory, coordlnotion problems and prisoner's dllerrmo problems. 11 There is a tendency throughout this tradition -from David Hume over Carl Menger to F. A. Hoyek -to argue as if the kind of explanotion that applies to coordination -type rules con be generollzed to other kinds of rules as weil, including those of the prisoner's dilemma type.
David Hume, for instance, in the context of his discussion on o "theory concerning the origin of property, and consequently of justice" ( 1975, 307) , refer s to the exomple of two men pulling the oars of a boot (1975, 306; 1967, 490) , as if the way oorsmen come to coordinote their respective activities could be considered to illustrate the generat characteristics of the pracess by whlch people come to respect property and to follow the rules of justice. 12 In the same context Hume (ibid.) cltes as further "examples" the ways in which "gold ond sllver are made the meosures of exchange" or "speech and words and langvage ore fixed". And it is in the same sense thot Hume refers to the example of the rules of the road whe n he talks obout "the necessity of rules , wherever men have any Inte rcou rse with each other " ( 1975, 210) . 13 All these excmples are, however, concerned with problems of the coordinatlon type rather than with the kind of prisoner's dilemma problems whlch seem to be typically at the basls of what we use to clossify as maral rules. 14 The 'perverse incentives' thot choracterlse prisoner's dilemma problems are absent in coordination problems, allowing rules to emerge and to be maintained much more smaothly in the latter case than in the former. 15 For recurrent coordination problems individuals' constitutional interests and action inte re sts ore typically in harmany, at least in the sense thot there is little or no incentive for 'defection', once a rule is e s tablished. As a coordination rule emerges -whethe r it concerns rowing o boot, the use of o generot medium of exchonge, the use of longuoge, or the rules of the rood -there exists, under s tondord conditions, no 'temptotion to defect'. While hoving o coordinotion rule estoblished in o community con, in some sense, be considered o 'public good', there is definitely no 'free-rider-problem' in the sense thot o person moy hope to goin extro-benefits by uniloterolly defecting. Coordinotion rules ore, in other terms, lorgely self-enforcing. 16
Rules providing solutions to recurrent prisoner's dilemmo type problems ore, by controst, typicolly not self-enforcing. There is no 'natural' hormony between constitutionol ond oction interests, even if there is perfect ogreement on the former omong oll members in o CO!l'YT•unity. Rother, additional incentives, 'additional' to the poyoffs embodied in the problem-defining poyoff structure, hove to be generoted somehow in order to bring constitutionol interests ond oction interests into hormony.
·
The ombiguity in Hume's discussion of the 'emergence of rules' issue is porolleled in Corl Menger's discussion on the some issue. Menger's explonotion on the 'origins of money', commonly cited os the por odigmotic exomple for an Invi sible-hand explonotion of rules ond institutions, is opporently concerned with o coordinotion type pr oblern ond hos little direct implicotions for prisoner's dilemmo type rules. In this sense it is misleoding indiscriminotely to Iist, os Menger does, phenomeno like low, longuoge, t he stote, money ond morkets os if oll involve the some kind of explonotory problem. 18 The some criticism flnolly opplies to F.A. Hoyek (1964, 5) when he tolks obout the spontaneaus emergence of "useful instltutio.ns ... such os longuoge, morols, Jow, writing, or money", implicitly suggesting by such o Iist thot the emergence of rules of morols con bosicolly be exploined olong the some lines os t he emergence of longuoge or money.
In view of the foilure of the spontaneaus order trodition odequotely to occount for the fundamental difference between coordinotlon rules, like rules of longuoge or rules of the rood, a· nd prlsoner's dilerrmo rules, like rules of morols, it connot be strongly enough emphosized thot an explonotion of the first connot be simply considered o model for an explonotion of the second. This does not meon, however, thot an Invisiblehand e xplonotion of the emergence of prisoner's dilemmo type rules is inconceivoble. lt only meons thot such an explonotion will hove to be stoted in somewhot different terms; in porticulor, it will hove to specify the forces or mechonisms thot curb t he ever -present utility-moximizing temptotion to defect. lmportont suggestions for such an explonotion hove, in foct, been mode within the spontaneaus order trodition, suggestions thot center araund the notion of reclprocity os o fundamental principle in human Interaction.
V. Redprocity ond Cooperotion
The prisoner's dilenmo notion ond the public goods notion ore· equivolent conceptuol tools to chorocterize the incentive structure underlying the morol order problem. The public goods interpretation draws ottention to the question of whot kinds of incentives moy induce an individual to contribute to the production of the public good 'morol order', where 'to contribute' is typicolly seen os o motter of an individuol's own behoviorol complionce with the relevant rules. This interpretotion is not complete, however, because there ore two woys in which ·individuols con contribute to the production of this 'good': By their own rule-complionce ond by providing incentives for others to comply. An invisible-hond theory of how prisoner's dilenmo type, moral · r11les come to be effective would hove to show how, in the process of sociol interoction, selective incentives ore spontoneously creoted which induce people to contribute, in the two woys mentioned, to the production of· o morol ordeL The notion of reciprocity is o centrol one in this context, i.e., the notion thot in sociol settings where individuols repeotedly interoct they ore in o position mutuolly to reinforce eoch other's behovior, to reword 'desiroble' ond to punish 'undesiroble' behovior. T hat reciprocity war k s os o . spontoneou s enforcement mechonism which encouroges cooperotive behovior hos been stressed ogoin ond ogoin throughout the history of sociol · theory ond ocross the various social sciences. lt was centrol to the sociol theory of Dovid Hume ond other eighteenth century Scottish morol philosophers, ond it is centrol to the socolled 'exchonge theory' in modern sociology. 19
More recently, in his book The Evolution of Cooperotion, R. Axelrod (1984) hos odded some interesting new ospects to the study of reciprocity. By woy of computer experiments Axelrod simuloted competition among potential alternative behoviorol strotegies thot octors moy odopt in recurrent prisoner's dilenmo type interoction Situations. The principol result thot Axelrod found is thot the simple strotegy of TIT FOR TAT (the strotegy of cooperoting in the first move ond then doing whotever the opponent did in the previous move) performed better thon any of the other strotegies thot were included in the experiment. The essential reoson for TIT FOR TAT's success is its combinotion of reodiness to cooperote on the one sid~, ond preporedness to 'punish' defection on the other. The willingness to cooperote (i.e. to comply with 'morol' rules) ollows an actor to reolize goins from cooperotion in intero' ctions with others who ore equolly disposed. Being . prepored to· punish defection protects an octor ogoinst continuou s ex ploitotion.
TIT FOR TAT obviously reflects the bosic pottern of the type of behavior thot the concept of reciprocity describes. Though human reciprocoting behovior is likely to be much more ·complex thon TIT FOR TAT, Axelrod's results ore of obvious relevonce for the study of reciprocity os o spontan-eous enforcement mechonism in everydoy sociol life. Reclprocoting behovlor hos been universolly observed ocross cultures ond through time, ond Axelrod's study illuminotes an obvious reoson why reciprocity con be expected to be o universal feoture of human soclol conduct: It is likely to be odopted simply becouse it tends to be mare successful thon alternative behoviorol strotegies. 20 There are boslcolly two forms thot such 'odoptlon' moy toke, or, stoted differently, two mechonisms by which 'success' con be expected to result in the behovlorol pottern's dlffusion, nomely ( 1) genetlc evolution ond (2) individual leorning . The observed potterns of human reciprocity con probobly be best understood os the combined outcome of both mechonlsms.
In his 1971 orticle The Evolution of Reciprocol Altr uism, the biologist R.L. Trivers sought to exploin reciprocoting behovior in evolutionory terms.
Trivers' onolyticol interest is in those kinds of behovlorol potterns thot produce some opporent benefit to o~other orgonism while involving some cost to the orgonlsm performing it. 2 As Trivers polnts out, beyond the relotlvely norrow Iimits of close kinship, where "kin selectlon" may ollow for the evolution of genuinely self-socrlficing behovior, natural selection con be expected to fovor helping potterns of behovior only where "in the lang run t hey benefit the orgonism performing them" (1971, 35) . This is, however, os Trivers orgues, typicolly the cose where such behovior is reciprocoted. To the extent thot reclproclty ollows for mutual net-beneflts, natural selectlon will tend to fovor reclprocoting behovlor. lt ollows for reolizotion of benefits from 'mutual helping' or cooperotlon without belng vulnerable to systematic exploitotion by 'cheoting', i.e. non-reciprocoting, lndividuols.
For reosons like those studied by Trivers, the disposition to reciprocote is likely, to some extent, to be geneticolly 'hord-wlred' into human 22 nature.
Leornlng certoinly supports the some behoviorol tendencies ond occounts for some of the extroordinory complexities thot chorocterize human reciprocity.
23 The Interaction of geneticolly inherited ond leorned troits in human Interaction oppeors to be exemplified by whot Trivers ( 1971, 49 ) colls "marolistic expression". Since r ewording os weil os punishing others ore costly to the octor, leorning will support such octivities only to the extent thot they ore opt to generote beneficiol consequences to the octor hirnself. On these grounds marolistlc oggression may be leorned os ' successful' behovlor in settings where the Initiator ond the oddressee of the oggression ore likely to . meet ogoln ond where, therefore, the 'shodow of the future' provldes o ratio nale for incurring t he costs of the oggression . There ore, howeve r, opporent Instonces of marolisticolly aggressive behovior thot do not seem to fit such o descrlption becouse the oggressor connot reosonobly expect thot the effects on the oddressee's future behovlor will generote benefits to him thot will outweigh the costs of his punishing oct. Out of emations like onger people sometimes tend to reciprocote or, more descriptively, to retoliote ogoinst defectors even in situotions where the potential future poyoffs from such behovior seem to be in obvious disproportion to the costs incurred. 24
The seemingly 'irrational' reodiness to punish others thot sometimes oppeors to be coused by emotions like onger seems to be difficult to occount for in terms of individual leorning. An evolutionory explonotion might, however, be constructed in terms of potential odvontoges thot such behoviour moy generote in the 'very long run'. To be disposed to punish defectors even in coses where rational colculotion would suggest not incurring the costs of doing so, moy weil be beneficiol in the Ionger run by providing better p.rotection from other octor's exploitotive inclinotions. To be perceived os somebody who is willing to hurt hirnself only to f},et the sotisfoction from toking revenge moy be o most effective deterrent.
VI. Trust Rules ond Solidority Rules
To the extent thot the production of 'morol order' involves the some problems os public goods production, in generol, rational self-seeking octors connot be expected to contribute, except if there ore selective incentives, i.e., benefits thot ore contingent on their own contributions. The principle of reciprocity con, in the sense described before, be expected to generote such selective incentives, ot least to some extent. ln terms of our eorlier onolysis: Redprocity con be expected to bring persons' operotlonol or oction interests into occordonce with their constitutionol interests in recurrent prisoner's dilemmo type Interaction situotions. The potential role thot reciprocity moy ploy in this respect requires, however, some quolificotion.
Redprocity seems . likely to emerge ond to be effective os o behoviorol pottern only in criticolly smoll-number settings, where individuols both identify others in the sociol interoction ond expect to experience further deolings within the some group. The question for us becomes one of identifying conditions under which persans ore likely to form smoll-number groups or 'cooperotive clusters' thot internolly secure rule-following through reciprocity. In this regord it ls useful to distinguish between two types of rules which we sholl coll trust rules ond solidority rules.
Trust-rules ore rules such os "keeping promises", "telling the truth" or "respecting others' property". Trust-rules hove their significonce typicolly in deolings omong porticulor persans. By his complionce with or tronsgression of trust-rules, o person selectively offects specific other persons. Becouse complionce with ond non-complionce with trust-rules is, in this sense, 'torgeted', the possibility of forming cooperotive clusters exists: Any subset of octors, down to ony two individuols, con reolize cooperotive goins by following those r ules in their deolings which eoch other. Adoption of ond complionce with trust-rules offers differential benefits to ony group or duster, independently of the behovior of other persans in the more indusive community or populotion. Even in an otherwise totolly dishonest world ony two individuols who stort to deol with eoch other honestly -by keeping promises, r especting property etc. -would fore better thon their fellow -men becouse of the goins from cooperotion thot they would be oble to reolize. To be sure, they would be even better off if oll their fellowmen could be trusted to oct honestly. But, whot is cruciol in the present context, there ore goins from rule-complionce thot con be reolized within ~ subset, however smoll, without ony need to ochieve indusive complionce within some predefined group. lt is precisely t he possibility of forming such cooperotive dus ters, i.e., the possibility of goins from cooperotion to be reolized by ony subset of octors, thot ollows the mechonism of reciprocity to be effective in enforcing t rust-rules.
Solidority -rules ore rules such os "not littering in public ploces", "respecting woiting lines", " not driving recklessly", "poying one's fair contribution to joint endeovour s", "not shirking one's duties in o teom", etc .. In cantrast to trust-rules, complionce with or violotion of solidorityrules connot be selectively torgeted ot porticulor other persons, ot least not within some 'technicolly' -i.e., by the nature of t he cose -defined group. There is olwoys o predefined group, oll members of which ore offected by their respective rule-reloted behovior. Whether the relevant group is o work teom (os in cose of the shirklng problem) or the world populotion (os in cose of certoin pollution problems), o per son connot ovoid by his complionce or non-complionce with the opplicoble solidority-rule indiscriminotely offecting oll members of the predifined group. For solidority rules it is not true, os it is for trust-rules, thot ony two individuols con stort to form o 'cooperotive duster' thot would ollow them to reolize differential goins from which their unconstroined fe liow-men ore exduded. Solidority-rules requlre odherence by some indusively defined persans before providing differential mutual benefits to t hose who odopt complionce behovior.
The very foct thot, in the cose of solidorlty-rules, dusterin~ is not poss ible, or possible only in o much more r estricted sense, 0 mokes reciprocity o much less effective mechonism of spontaneaus enforcement for those kinds of rules. The cruciol dlfference thot separates the two kinds of rules in t his regord is reflected in the differences between Axelrod's study, The Evolution of Cooperotion ( 1984) ond his more recent study, The Evolution of Norms ( 1986b). Though this ls not an expliclt port of Axelrod's own Interpretation, the 1984 study con be soid to be obout t he spontaneaus emergence of tru st-rules, while his 1986 study is an ottempt to exploin the spontaneaus emergence of solidority-rules (the exomple t hot Axelrod uses in this study is the norm "not cheoting on exoms").
Chorocteristicolly, the notion of dustering is centrot to the first study but ploys no role whotsoever in the lotter. lnsteod, the cruciol explonotory roJe is ployed here by ossumptions obout 'vengefulness' os on inherent emotional energy thot mokes people willing to incur some cost in order not only to punish others whom they observe cheating, but also -ond this turns out to be the centrot port in Axelrod's occount of the 'evolution of norms' -to punish others for failing to punish observed defections.
VII. Clustering ond Complionce
Where individuols repeotedly interoct with eoch other, there ore direct personal goins to be mode by obeying rules like "keeping promises" ond by punishing others for defecting. lt is the 'shodow af the future', the expected effects of one's own current behovior on the opponent's future behovior, that is cruciol for one's current behoviorol choices. 27 In deoling with reciprocdting opponents one con not expect to be oble to get awoy with 'cheoting', ond the only woy to secure their ongoing cooperotion is by ploying by the rules. lt is in on individuol's direct interest to behove in such o way thot he is perceived by others os someone who con be trusted os an honest person . Being trustworthy mokes one on attroctive portner for cooperotion ond, thus, increoses ·one's prospects of· realizing cooperative · golns. 28 On the ather hond, t he interest in protecting oneself agolnst exploitotion provides on immediate incentive for punishing cheoters. The most obvious ond least costly form of punishment is simply to exclude o cheoter from cooperoticin until he mokes up for his dishonest behovior end proves hirnself to be o trustworthy person. But on individual moy very weil hove on incentive to t oke strenger punitive meosures, even though they ore more costly to hirnself. Such behovior sends o message to one's direct opponent os weil· os to third porties. It indicotes that one is prep·ored strictly to retoliote whenever one is being cheoted on. In oddition', by signoling to other members of the group thot the opponent is a cheot, one is oble to inflict -ot little cost to oneself -on even more effective punishment os others will be more reluctont to deol with the defector in the future .
With trust-rules, the mechonism of reciprocity is copable af activating private interests in following such rules and in punishing others for rule violations. In this sense, 'moral order' con be expected to be generated, at least to some extent, spontaneously, through reciprocity, an observation that might be taken as an example for how a public good may be produced os a by-product of individuals' separate pursuits of purely private interests. lt should be noted, though, that, as far as trust-rules are concerned, · 'moral order' can be considered a public good in a limited sense only. To be sure, there are certain benefits from living in a community of honest people thot ore genuinely public . Consequently, there ore opporent opportunities for defectors to 'free-ride' on these benefits in the sense of taking advontage of an environment where people are generolly honest ond expect others to be generally honest. But the mechonism of reciproclty does not ollow for someone systemotically to 'free-ride' on other persons' complionce with trus t -rules. Defectors will be inevitably excluded from those benefit s thot con only be realized in on goin g cooperoti ve relotion s.
For solidority-rules it is obviously true -os it is for prisoner's dlleiTTI'Ia type rules in generol -thot o rational octor's constitutional interests in such rules do not, per se, generate complionce . Separate, selectlve incentives ore requi r ed for bringing operational or action interests into accordance with constitutionol interests. lt is with regard to t he woy in which such selective incentives can be expected to be generated that a cruciol difference exists between solidarity-rules ond trust-rules, a difference thot hos to do with the extent to which the benefits thot result from obeying and enforcing these rules are genulnely public goods, the beneflts of which ' splll over' among a !arge number of non-excludable reclpients . The mix of benefits o person generotes by obeying ond enforcing solidar ity-r ules, systemotic~lly tends to ·include (othe r things being equol) mo r e public ond less private elements, os compored to trust-rules. In foct, rother thon being viewed os o dlchotomy, the distinction between trustrules ond solidorlty-rules moy be more opproprlotely interpreted in terms of o continuum olong which rules moy be locoted occording to t he degree of 'publicness' of the benefits from rule-obedience.
The incentives for complying wit h trust-rules ond for punishing others who defect derive from the; expected effects of ane's own octions on other octors' f uture behovior. These effects include, in the fir st place, the effects on one's direct opponents' future behovior: The gains ane can expect from making them rroore inclined to cooperote ond less inclined to defect in future interoctions. In oddition, expected . indirect effects on third parties moy also provide incentives for an individual to comply with rules ond to punish cheoters. To be perceived as a trustworthy but also vengeful person increases one's prospects of reolizing goins from Cooperation afd, at t he some time, mokes one an unsuitable target for exploitotion . 2 In ony event, it is the expected effects on other persons' future behovior towords the octor hirnself thot provide private inventives for complying with trust-rules and for punishing defectors. The some connot be said for solidarity-rules. By complying with rules like "not shirking one's duties in a team", o person generotes benefits thot are public to the relevant group. These benefits connot be selectively allocated in order to affect t he behovior of particular member s within the group. On the other hand, by punishing others who defect, o person moy moke their future complionce mor e likely. Yet he will shore the benefits from such 'improved behavior' with oll members of the relevant group, without selective rewards to himself. in other words, by complying with solidority-rules ond by punishlng others for not complying, o person is producing o genuine public good, i.e., beneflts thot ore shored by oll members of some predefined group ond thot, os such, do not quolify os selective incentives.
The . obove orguments do not imply thot there exist no selective incentives ot oll for individuols to comply with solidority-rules ond to punish defectors. Such incentives moy exist, for lnstonce, where o person's behovior toword solidority-rules offects his reputotion. Such behovior moy be perceived by others os o signol obout whot type of person he is. And this ogoin moy offect their future behovior toword the person. 30 A person's reveoled willingness to comply with solidority-rules moy be interpreted by (direct or indirect) observers os indicotive of his generol trustworthiness. And o parallel orgument moy opply to o person's reveoled willingness to contribute to the enforcement of solidority-rules. in oddition to such kinds of selective incentives, the emotional foctors thot hove been discussed obove under the Iabel 'morolistic oggression' con also be expected to contribute, to some extent, to o spontaneaus enforcement of solidorityrules. in foct, os mentioned before, it is these emotional foctors thot ploy o cruciol role in Axelrod's model of the 'evolutlon of norms' { 1986). 31
VIII. From Hobbesion Anorchy to Moral Order
A mojor implicotion of . our onolysis for the 'Hobbesion problern of sociol order' is thot the dustering option thot exists for trust-rules mokes the leop out of the Hobbesion onorchy somewhot less difficult thon the common public goods Interpretation of morol order suggests. As for os trust-rules ore concerned, lndividuols do hove meons, even in !arge number settings, 'privotely' to orchestrote the tronsition from. onorchy to morol order. F?r the first step towords o normative order to be token, no more is required thon thot just two, an}! two, 'inventive' individuols reolize thot they con fore better by deoling 'honestly' with eoch other, by following in their deolings with eoch other certoin rvles. Such o two-person cooperotive duster con get the order -creoting process storted becouse the differential success of the Initial cooperotors con be expected to provide incentives for others, either to join the existing duster or to copy the successful cooperative orrongement . Reciprocity will, ot least to some extent, protect existing cooperotive dusters ogoinst Invasion by defectors: Reciprocoting octors will . ollow only those octors to be induded in their cooperotive network who ore willing to submit to ·the rules.
Since the possibility of discriminoting between 'cooperotors' ond 'defectors' is criticol for the stobility of cooperotive .dusters, there ore opporent Iimits to the group-size up to which the principle of reciprocity moy serve os o workoble mechonism of spontaneaus rule enforcement. But o plausible explanatory account seems possible of a gradual process by which a more extended, 'segmented' moral order may emerge, a moral order that extends beyond the Iimits of single cooperative dusters that exist as scattered 'islands' within a Hobbesian world. Such a more extended, but still largely 'spontaneous' moral order might be achieved through a kind of 'second order' dustering ·process. Just as, on the individual Ievel, any two actors can profit from forming a cooperative duster, on the group Ievel any two groups can realize additional cooperative gains by entering some kind of mutual collective surety arrangement. By collectively accepting responsibility for each group member's rule compliance in his dealings with members of the other group, the intra-group enforcement potential is made effective for creating a normative order in between~groups dealings, thus allowing for mutually profitable transa. ctions to be carr.ied out beyend the Iimits of the original cooperative dusters. The requirenients for such 'second order' cooperative dusters to emerge are equally parsimonious as the requirements for the initial emergence of · cooperative duster-s: It takes no more than just any two groups that are 'inventive' enough to realize the gains that can be made by such a surety arrangement, and, once a 'model' exists, other ~roups have an incentive to participate in or to imitate such arrangements. 2 · A more generat condusion concerning the relation between group size and the prospects for a spontaneously created moral order is implied in our analysis. In discussions on this issue a corrrnon supposition is that there exists an inverse relation between group-size and the likelihood of a moral order spontaneously to emerge and to be sustained. It is typically argued that -in the absenc· e of deliberately organized enforcement -persons' willingness to contribute to the production of 'moral order' will decrease as group size increases, for the same reasons that are familiar from the generat discussion on the significance of group size for the production of public goods: 33 First, the individual will have less and Iess reason to expect that his own contribution (his own compliance· and his punishing of · defectors) will be decisive for the persistence of moral order. And, second, the informal, spontaneaus mechonisms of enforcement will be less effective in !arger and more anonymaus groups.
Our analysis of the differences between trust-rules and solidarity-rules suggests that the standard diagnosis concerning the relevance of group size for the moral order issue needs to be qualified. lt should be apparent that solidarity-rules · and trust-rules are not affected in exactly the same way by growing group size, in particular, thot the latter are much less vulnerable to increasing numbers than the former. The formation of cooperative dusters which is possible with regard to trust-rules, makes rules like "keeping promises" much more robust and resistent against the detrimental effect of increasing numbers. So far as trust-rules are concerned, individuals dci have means, even in [arge number settings, to start building o 'morol order'1 means thot ore not ovailoble to them in the same way where solidority-rules ore concerned.
To the extent thot different kinds of social settings or environments in which persans interoct con be meoningfully arroyed olong the trust-rules/ solidority-rules distinction 1 the orguments thot we have eloboroted here have implicotions for our understonding of the working principles of these different settings. The fundamental Hoyekian distinction between two kinds of social order -between 'spontoneous order' ond 'directed sociol order' 1 or 1 more specificolly 1 between morket order and orgonization -directly comes to mind in this. context. 34 The 'rules of the game' that chorocterize or define . o morket-type order ore apporently more of the trust-rules thon of the solidarity-rules variety 1 while the opposit. e is true for organizotion-type orders -a fact that should have relevant implications for the relative robustness of the respective kinds of order. Morkets possess the great advontoge 1 over other types of social orrongements 1 that they are based on two-party tronsactions when finolly reduced to their bosic elements. lt is this feoture thot gives reciprocity its effectiveness os o complionce-inducing device. lt is not ot oll surprising thot the 18th century discoverers of the self-enforcing chorocteristics of morket order were exited. The Hobbesion problern of order hod been 1 in lorge port 1 resolved. Recognition of the some reciprocity chorocteristic of morket Interaction hos led Dovid Gouthier ( 1986 1 83ff.) to coll the ideolized morket o "morol-free zone".
All this is not to suggest 1 of course 1 thot the self-enforcing copocity inherent in morkets would moke the explicitly constructed orms ond ogencies of the low dispensoble. It seems nonetheless cleor 1 however 1 thot markets remoin porticulorly robust sociol orrongements for the reosons noted here.
Notes
Instonces for the 'functionolist follocy' con notobly be found in sociology ond onthropology 1 in porticulor in the functionalist schools within these disciplines. Economics 1 becouse of its dominontly individualistic orientation 1 has been less susceptible in this respect though it has not been perfectly inmune from this type of· follocy 1 e.g. in some of the onolyses concerning the emergence of 'efficient' in stitutions.
2 A similor distinction is made by Heckethorn 1987 who uses the terms "inclinations" and "regulatory interests" in order to distinguish between the interests ( "inclinations") thot make rational octor s in prisoner's dilenma situotions choose the mutually destructive strategy ond their ("regulatory") interests in hoving the choice situotion reguloted in o woy that would ollow them to reolize the mutually advantageaus cooperative outcome.
3 In this sense, mony of the corrrnon uses of the 'proctice whot you preoch' orgument ore inoppropriote if the inference of inconsistency is mode. lt is not necessorily inconsistent to odvocote o sociol rule while ot the some time behoving differently from the woy thot might be dictoted by generolized odherence to the sociol rule being odvocoted .
4 Although, in his writings on the philosophy of low Sitten), Kont ls weil owore of the difference between interests. Cf. Kont 1887, 91ff., 155ff., 163tf. references to Hortmut Kliemt).
(Metaphysik der the two klnds of (We owe these 5 For o discussion of the 'rotionolity of morolity' issue in terms of o choice of dispositions rother thon cose-by-cose cholces see also Vonberg 1988 . 6 Gouthier 1986 83: "The essential point in our orgument is thot one's disposition to choose offects the situotions in which one moy expect to find oneself." - Hormon ( 1986, 6) identifies the some kind of orgument in Dovid Hume's explonotion of morols out of self-lnterest: "Selfinterest is involved becouse, if you connot be trusted to tell the truth, keep your promises or ovoid injuring your ossociotes, people will not join up with you in corrrnon enterprises ond you will lose out in comporison with other people who do te.ll the truth, keep their promlses, ond ovoid injury to ossociotes . "
•.
7 Gouthier's 1987, 8 sees o shortcomlng of John Rowls' controctorion conception in the foct thot Rowls shows why it is rational for persans to ogree on certoin principles, but "does not show, or ottempt to show, the rotionolity of their complionce with the ogreed principles".
8 In foct, Gouthier's orgument is not olwoys perfectly unombiguous in this respect since, ot some ploces, he opporently presupposes thot conditions ore de focto given under which complionce con be expected to be in o person's interests. Cf. e . g. Gouthier 1987, 14 : "So what· we suppose is thot I find reoson to comply with constroining principles in the benefits thot occrue to me ~hrough the response of my fellows ••• " 9 The porodigmotic notion is, of course, thot of the spontaneaus order of morkets. lt should be kept in mind, though, thot the spontaneaus coordinotion within morkets ond the enforcement of the legolinstitutionol fromework of morkets ore different issues. The notion of spontaneaus morket coordinotion con very weil be combined with o more 'constructivist' view on the institutionol fromework.
11 In terms of the typical pay-off structure in a 2x2 matrix the two kinds of Interaction problems can be characterised as follows: 12 In the setting that Hume obviously has in mind -nomely -the two men pulling one oar at different sides of the boat -the oorsmen are clearly focing a pure coordination problem. There exists, in such a setting, simply no opportunity for 'cheating' . The situation is different, of course, if the oarsmen ore pulling two oors each, one sitting behind the other.
13
In the context from which the quotation is taken, Hume draws a comparison between rules for the conduct of ordinary games and the "rules of justice, fidelity, and loyalty" (1975, 210) upon which a society is based. After emphasizing that the comparison is in several ways "very imperfect", Hume stetes: "We may only learn from it the necesslty of rules, wherever men have any Intercourse with each other. They cannot even pass each other on the road without rules. Waggoners, coachmen, and postlllions have principles, by which they give the way". (ibid.)
14 The relation between moral rules and prisoner's dilerrma problems is stressed in Gouthier 1986. On Gauthier's argument cf. Buchenon 1987, 8f. ; cf. also Vonberg 1988, 3f. 15 The two kinds of problern situations and the respective kinds of problem-solving rules are discussed in more detail in Vonberg 1986.
16 Their self-enforcing choracter implies on the other hand that, while coordination rules may be spontaneously established, a saontaneous transition from some established coordination rule (e.g. 11 riving on the right side of the rood") to a different one may be unlikely or even impossible, even· though the other rule may be preferable in terms of people's constitutionol interests. In this sense, and only in this sense, people's constitutional interests and their action interests may be in 'disharmony' even for coordination rules. But such potential disharmony is, of course, a totally different issue than the typicol disjunction between constitutionol and compliance interests in case of prisoner's dilei'TTTlO type morol rules, the issue that we are interested in here.
17 See the different ordinol ronkings of poy-offs in footnote 11. 18 Menger 1985, 147: 11 Low, longuoge, the stete, money, morkets, oll these sociol structures in their vorious empiricol forms ond in their constont chonge ore to no smoll extent the unintended result of sociol development. The pnces of goods, interest rotes, ground rents, woges, ond o thousond other phenomeno of sociol life in generol ond of economy in porticulor exhibit the some peculiority. Also, understonding of them ••. must be onologous to the understonding of unintentionolly creoted sociol institutions . The solution of the most importont problems of the theoreticol sociol sciences in generol ond of theoreticol economics in porticulor is thus closely connected with the question of theoreticolly understonding the origin ond chonge of 'orgonicolly' creoted sociol structures.
11
19 The role of the reciprocity notion in sociol theory, in porticulor with regord to the Scottish morol philosophy, to onthropology ond to exchonge-sociology, is discussed in Vonberg 1975 , 15ff., 55ff., ond Vonberg 1982 20 It hos been occosionolly orgued (cf. e.g. Gouldner 1960) thot people's disposition to reciprocote reflects o 'norm of reciprocity' which re<Juires such behovior os 'proper' conduct. Though it is certoinly true thot normative expectotions ore often ottoched to reciprocoting behovior (concerning 'grotitude' os weil os 'revenge'), the universolity of such behovior strongly indicotes thot those normative expectotions ore o secondory, not primory, phenomenon, thot they ore o consequence rother thon the couse of the generol behoviorol tendency to reciprocote.
21 Trivers 1971 , 35 Iabels such behovior 11 oltruistic 11 :
11 Altruistic behovior con be defined os behovior thot benefits onother orgonism, not closely reloted, while being opporently detrimentol to the orgonlsm performing the behovior, benefit ond detriment being defined in terms of inclusive fitness.
-
The terms 11 oltruistic 11 ond 11 oltruism 11 ore probobly not the best to describe the behovior under investigotion, since these terms tend to presuppose certoin ossumptions obout the 'underlying motivotion'. It would seem to be preferoble to use o term thot is purely descriptive of the behovior thot is to be exploined, ond thot is neutral obout how it is to be exploined. Hirshleifer 1978, 240 "because human oltruism may span huge periods of time, o lifetime even, ond becouse thousonds of exchonges moy take ploce, involving mony different 'goods' ond with mony different cost benefit ratlos, the problern of computing the relevant totals, detecting imbolonces, and declding whether they ore due to chance or to smoll-scale cheating is an extremely difficult one . " -For an Interpretation of reciprocity as leorned behovior cf. e.g. Hornans 1974, 5lff. 26 lt is certoinly possible for subgroups within o given community to reolize differential goins from internolly procticing solidority rules. For instonce, a work team whose members refroin from shirking will be more prod uctive thon teoms whose members ore 'morally unconstrained'. The cruciol point, however, is thot with solidarity-rules not~ subset con realize differential gains from rule compliance. There olwoys exists a technicolly (by the nature of the collective good thot rulecomplionce produces) defined group for which some inclusive rulecomplionce hos to be secu red.
27 Axelrod 1984, 12: "Whot makes it possible for cooperation to emerge is the foct thot the ployers might meet agoin. This possibility means thot the choices mode today not only determine the outcome of this move, but con also influence the later choice of the players. The future con therefore cost o shodow back upon the present ond thereby offect the current strotegic situotion."
28 The point thot is of interest here hos been nicely articuloted by Sumner 1918, 95 : "Same soy thot a man cannot offord to be honest unless everybody is honest. The truth is thot, if there was one honest man anong a Iot of cheots, his chorocter ond reputotion would reach their moximum volue • • • • lf o man .
• . does right, the rewords of doing right ore obtoined. They ore not os great os could be obtoined if oll did right, but they ore greoter thon those enjoy who still do wrang."
29 It should be added, though, thot being perceived as a vengeful person moy involve a certain trode-off: While providing protection from exploitotion, it may also decreose, to some extent, one's ottroctiveness OS a potential partner for cooperotion becouse others may worry obout the risk of being vengefully prosecuted if they should ever inodvertently defect or if they should be mistoken for defectors.
30 Axelrod 1986a, 1107: "An importont, ond often dominant, reoson to respect a norm is thot violating it would provide o signol about the type of person you ore • . . This is an example of the signoling principle: a violotion of a norm is not only o bit of behovior thot hos o payoff for the defector ond for others, it is also o signal thot cantoins
